Thoughts about the present and the (best) future for rational skepticism.

Introduction

For about the last five years, I have been the president of the Swiss Skeptics, a nonprofit based in Zurich, Switzerland. Now, as I am stepping down, I feel inclined to reflect, and there is much reflection to be done. Besides the failings of me as a leader (of which there are many), I have been thinking about the skeptic movement in and of itself a lot.

Coming into contact with rational, scientific skepticism (as opposed to the irrational flavor of skepticism, as in „climate change skeptics“) has probably been the most important part of my personal intellectual development. Rational skepticism has influenced my thinking much more profoundly than, say, my academic education and work (including my PhD). The way I think about the world and about my own thinking has been radically shaped and improved by skepticism: Had I never come into contact with the skeptic movement, I might still be mostly unaware of how fallible the human mind is when it comes to forming beliefs and making inferences about the world. I owe a lot to the skeptic movement.

Over time, however, I have grown somewhat disenchanted with the skeptic movement. I don’t want to diminish the work of the skeptic community: Many amazing people put a lot of effort into rational skepticism. But I believe that there are several problems within the skeptics movement that ultimately hold it back from being truly effective. In the following sections, I will try to describe some of those problems.

Skepti-what? Ill-defined basic concepts

Individuals and organizations who subscribe to the notion of rational skepticism probably have roughly similar ideas about the way they try to understand the world. But what exactly does skepticism mean? Surely there is some definition (or family of definitions) that explains what exactly is meant by rational skepticism? Unfortunately, and surprisingly, that is not the case.

Here is how the late and great Carl Sagan understood skepticism¹:

What skeptical thinking boils down to is the means to construct, and to understand, a reasoned argument and, especially important, to recognize a fallacious or fraudulent argument. The question is not whether we like the conclusion that emerges out of a train of reasoning, but whether the conclusion follows from the premises or starting point and whether that premise is true.

For Carl Sagan, skepticism seems to be mostly about proper logic. Another influential definition is that coined by Michael Shermer in his „skeptic manifesto“². In this manifesto, a rational skeptic is referred to as a person with the following traits:

One who questions the validity of particular claims of knowledge by employing or calling for statements of fact to prove or disprove claims, as a tool for understanding causality.

This understanding of skepticism seems to be somewhat different from the first one. In this definition, skepticism means questioning the validity of „claims of knowledge“, by relying on „statements of fact“ to prove or disprove claims. Also, skepticism is a tool for „understanding causality“. Another definition that you are likely to stumble upon on Google is the following one by Brian Dunning from the website Skeptoid³:

It’s the process of finding a supported conclusion, not the justification of a preconceived conclusion.

This definition is similar to the first one, but the focus seems to be on the fact that one should arrive at valid conclusions in an open-minded manner instead of trying to support what they already believe to be true. Yet another definition that I have found several times is one proposed by the clinical neurologist and skeptic Steven Novella⁴:

A skeptic is one who prefers beliefs and conclusions that are reliable and valid to ones that are comforting or convenient, and therefore rigorously and openly applies the methods of science and reason to all empirical claims, especially their own. A skeptic provisionally proportions acceptance of any claim to valid logic and a fair and thorough assessment of available evidence, and studies the pitfalls of human reason and the mechanisms of deception so as to avoid being deceived by others or themselves. Skepticism values method over any particular conclusion.

In this definition, there is once again the element that we should avoid believing things that we merely want to believe and that we should instead seek valid „beliefs and conclusions“. In addition, there is an emphasis on the „pitfalls of human reason and the mechanisms of deception“. Finally, another definition that Google might redirect you to is one found on the wiki page RationalWiki⁵:

Skepticism (or scepticism) is the art of constantly questioning and doubting claims and assertions, and holding that the accumulation of evidence is of fundamental importance.

In this definition, the focus seems to be that within skepticism, „claims and assertions“ are constantly questioned and that evidence is regarded as important for evaluating those claims and assertions.

The above definitions are only a limited sample, and they might be a biased, not very representative sample. But I think they demonstrate that definitions of rational skepticism are, ultimately, rather vague. Logic seems to play a role, as does evidence (Scientific evidence should be regarded as more pertinent when it comes to evaluating a claim than, say, feelings and wishful thinking.). These definitorial fragments, however, do not form a clear and coherent definition. If the skeptic movement has no somewhat clearly defined idea of what it is the movement adheres to, that is an obvious problem. Most skeptics, of course, don’t spend their time thinking about what skepticism is – they are actually doing practical (and important!) work. The absence of a clear conceptual basis of rational skepticism, however, means that skeptics are ultimately unable to effectively communicate what it is that they do, and that they themselves rely on intuition and heuristics for justifying their skeptical work.

The skeptic movement needs to work on its basic concepts. I understand that most skeptics want to address real-world problems and do things, but getting the basics right (in the sense of accurate and precise definitions) is tremendously important for applied, practical skeptical work. In our organization, the Swiss Skeptics, we have tried to get the ball rolling in this area. In a discussion paper⁶, I define skepticism as the process of applying critical thinking. Critical thinking, I propose, is a metacognitive skill applicable to the evaluation of truth claims. The metacognitive skill that is critical thinking, I further argue, consists of three components:

1. minimization of logical fallacies
2. minimization of cognitive biases
3. probabilistic epistemology

Working on definitions of core concepts might seem „boring“ to some degree, but this is the foundational work upon which rational skepticism ought to be built. If we forgo this work and simply do applied skeptical things (that is, essentially, how things are now), then we risk not knowing why we are doing what we are doing, what exactly we should be doing, and how we should be doing it.

Goals, means, and prioritization

Skeptics do many things in many ways. In my opinion, the amount of work that members of the skeptic movement do all over the world is nothing short of amazing. Impressive though the work of the skeptic community is, it is also very heterogeneous. There is a whole lot going on in the skeptic movement, but in all that activity, it is hard to so what exactly the goals that are being pursued are. This problem of unclear goals in the skeptic movement is at least threefold:

• Which goals are to be pursued?
• Which goals are more important that others?
• How should goals be pursued?

The first question is very difficult to answer in general. Often, we do things because we feel that doing them is the right thing, but we don’t necessarily specify what exactly it is that we want to achieve by doing them. In the skeptic movement, the main goals that are pursued seem to me somewhat vague. In general, skeptics pursue a melange of different kinds of goals. One of the goals seems to be to provide corrective information about claims that might have some form of negative consequences (Think of, for example, health charlatans.). A second goal of skeptics, it seems to me, is to spread awareness for science and the scientific method. A third goal of skeptics, I believe, is to provide general information about skepticism / critical thinking. Finally, a fourth goal of skeptics is to create a sense of community among fellow skeptics.

In a way, these goals are all valuable. But they are very broad, meaning that there are many potential specific sub-goals that can be pursued in order to achieve these meta-goals. There are not only many sub-goals, but also many means to achieving those goals. The means (or you could call them instrumental goals) that members of the skeptic movement employ span many different activities, such as blogs, websites, podcasts, conferences,  books, and so forth. Skeptics want to achieve many different things and they do many different things in order to achieve them.

The multitude of goals that skeptics pursue is a consequence of the general nature of skepticism / critical thinking. Skepticism does not apply to one specific domain or issue, so skeptics have a lot of things to do. That is a big challenge, and that challenge is probably holding the skeptic movement back. There are so many goals skeptics pursue (at least tacitly) that deciding which goals to pursue and how to pursue them is difficult. I call this the prioritization problem of the skeptic movement.

In order for the skeptic movement to become more effective and more efficient, we need a substantive prioritization debate. Such a debate is essentially inexistent today, besides the occasional less-than-constructive criticism⁷. Working on defining goals and means for achieving goals might seem „boring“, just as conceptual work described further above might. Developing a framework for identifying and prioritizing goals is essential foundational work, however. Imagine, for example, starting a company: Having a highly motivated team that wants to do things is great, but having no plan whatsoever about what exactly your company is supposed to do and how it is supposed to do it is not the best course of action.

Reacting or acting?

One of the most prominent traits of the skeptic movement, in my view, is the fact that skeptics are quick and very good at providing corrective information whenever irrational and scientifically dubious claims are made in the public sphere. For example, when some well-known celebrity promotes unsubstantiated health claims, skeptics are very good at discussing those claims and evaluating them in light of the best evidence that is available. That is an enormously valuable public service.

However, the fact that skeptics usually react to events is also one of the reasons why the impact of the skeptic community is limited. In order to have greater impact, skeptics should be much more active, not just reactive. Reacting to events means that the agenda is set by outside events, not by skeptics. When skeptics are merely reacting to events, their goals are ultimately dictated to them. I believe that skeptics should be reactive only when that serves their overal goals or when it is an instrumental goal. Simply reacting to events because they are happening is a bad strategy that is „wasting“ resources that might be used more effectively for other purposes. Of course, this specific criticism does not mean that all members of the skeptic movement only react to events. There are plenty of „proactive“ individuals, organizations, and projects within the skeptic movement. Some that come to mind are the Good Thinking Society in the UK⁸, the Information Network Homeopathy in Germany⁹, or, alas, the Swiss Skeptics (The majority of our activities are active rather than reactive.). I believe that the majority of the available resources in the skeptic movement should be invested in „proactive“ activities.

Low levels of professionalization

Some resources in the skeptic community are plentiful. There are many motivated and skilled people in the movement who are willing to invest a lot of time and effort into the movement. Unfortunately, one resources that is lacking is money. Without money, there is no professionalization, and without professionalization, there is no sustainable impact.

Most organizations in the skeptic movement are nonprofits. While that is not a bad thing in and of itself, most skeptical nonprofits have relatively little money at their disposal. The result of that pecuniary situation is that only few people are able to make a living from working in skeptical organizations. Ultimately, this means that skeptical work is a voluntary activity that people have to squeeze around their professional, day job routines. This situation is detrimental in at least two ways. First, even though there is plenty of manpower in the skeptic movement, most of it is limited, part-time manpower. Second, when push comes to shove, many active skeptics have to suspend or even completely abandon their voluntary skeptical work and focus on their professional careers. That is simply the way the world works: Adults need money to live.

One of the highest priorities of skeptical organizations should be to generate revenue streams that are as large and as sustainable as possible. That is not to say that skeptical organizations should become for-profit companies (Even though I believe that there is a place for skeptical entrepreneurship.). Money is simply the most important resource for any kind of organization: When you have money, you can pay people for working, and when you pay people to work for you, and when people work for you in this professional manner, much more work can be done than on a purely voluntary basis. Generating as much money as possible is necessary in order to make the skeptic movement more effective and more efficient.

Fragmentation

The premise of this article is that there is a skeptic movement. Social movements, of course, are not as easy to pin down as other forms of social activity. For example, there are pretty clear and unambiguous criteria for defining and spotting a company. Movements, on the other hand, are inherently diffuse. What makes a movement a movement is usually something like a shared set of beliefs and some level of formal or informal interaction within a network of individuals, groups, and organizations^{10 11}. Is the skeptic movement really a movement?

One commonly accepted trait of what I refer to as the skeptic movement is that there are many individuals and organizations around the world who, presumably, belong to this movement. None of these individuals and organizations, however, share a truly coherent set of beliefs and they do not interact with each other in a coordinated manner. There are attempts to change that. For example, one of the most important projects for creating some level of regional inter-organizational coordination is the European Council of Skeptical Organisations ECSO¹². Even though the ECSO is over 20 years old, it recently underwent a slight „modernization“ process that resulted in new ideas and new activities. Even though the ECSO is facing the same challenges as other skeptical organizations (such as a lack of funding and thus no professionalization), efforts such as ECSO are crucial for making the skeptic movement more manifestly a movement. That does not mean that all skeptical individuals and organizations need to have the same goals and do the same things. Some level of coordination and cooperation will simply help to better align beliefs, goals, and activities within the skeptic movement.

Star culture

One of the, arguably, best features of the skeptic movement is also one of its major weaknesses: The star culture. There are many prominent skeptics who are well known outside of skeptic circles, such as Daniel Dennet, James Randi, Michael Shermer, Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan, Lawrence Krauss, and so forth. That can be a great thing: If one of the main meta-goals of skeptics is to build awareness for rational skepticism, then prominent skeptical ambassadors are very helpful in achieving that goal.

The star culture in the skeptic movement might be beneficial in some regards, but it is not withouth its downsides. First, and perhaps most importantly: Success of skeptical stars does not necessarily translate into overall success for the skeptic movement. Simply because a few prominent skeptics are well known and successful as, for example, book authors does not mean that the skeptic movement as a whole is able to achieve goals more effectively or more efficiently because of that. Even the opposite is possible. For example, skeptics tend to invest a lot of resources into bringing star skeptics to skeptical conferences. Those resources might be better used in the pursuit of other, higher priority goals. Second, when a few stars are very important for the skeptic movement, the professional and personal failings of those stars can hurt the movement. For example, it has been reported in some detail how Lawrence Krauss systematically engaged in sexual harassment for years¹³. His behavior has damaged the skeptic movement in the United States, but it was tolerated for years because of his stardom. Third, the skeptic star culture is not sustainable. If and when star skeptics leave the limelight or die, their absence can leave a void that is not easy to fill.

The skeptic movement does not necessarily have to abandon star culture altogether, but it should regard it as an instrumental goal. Prominent skeptical ambassadors can be an effective tool for achieving some goals, but skeptical ambassadors are not a meta-goal in and of themselves.

Too little substance

The skeptic movement is amazingly productive: A great number of articles on blogs and websites as well as many podcasts are created every day. But it seems to me that, overall, the great majority of those outputs are geared towards covering many specific topics and not towards analyzing only a few topics in greater detail. The result of this is that skeptics produce a lot of text and audio (and sometimes video) output, but most of that output is limited in substance.

This might sound harsh, but remember that further above, I lament both the lack of money as well as the tendency of skeptics to react rather than to act. When there is no money to employ people and when skeptics usually react to events, the natural outcome is that most of the skeptical output is rather brief and episodic. I believe that the skeptic movement should begin to invest some of its resources into projects that dig a little deeper and take more time. There are two benefits to doing so. First, when skeptics engage in substantive projects, they can create beacons of information and discourse for other skeptics as well as for the public at large. For example, conceptual work on skepticism should be done in the form of such projects, and the output is useful to everybody. Even though such projects might take relatively longer than, say, a single blogpost, they ultimately save time, because they can be relatively well-sourced and extensive, so that they represent work other skeptical individuals and organizations can use, rely on, and improve upon. Second, more profound projects have an important signaling function to the public at large as well as to specific stakeholders. When a skeptical organization wants to approach, for example, policy stakeholders or the media, doing so with some specific substantive original work is much easier than with a loose collection of blog posts and podcast episodes.

What might such more substantive projects look like? At the Swiss Skeptics, we try to engage in three forms of such more „substantive“ work. We have discussion papers¹⁴ (to continue in 2018 after a break in 2017), some tentative practical projects¹⁵, and we have begun doing research¹⁶. These formats are not necessarily the ones that other skeptical organizations should pursue, but our work shows one possible approach that is worth exploring.

Morality and politics

The skeptic movement is, traditionally, epistemologically inclined: Skeptics are mostly concerned with how people form beliefs and how that process can be improved. Morality, the question of how people should behave, is not traditionally a domain of rational skepticism. In the past couple of years, it seems to me that morality has become increasingly important in the skeptic movement, but, I am afraid, not in a good way.

Many skeptics have disliked so-called „postmodernism“ for quite a while. In 1996, the physicist Alan Sokal published a fake postmodernist philosophical paper that was meant to criticize the most irrational tendencies of postmodern thought^{17 18}. Such criticism is justified: I believe that a lot of postmodernist work, and, for that matter, most of continental philosophy in general, is irrational. Most skeptics who have heard of postmodernism probably have a negative attitude towards it. Bashing postmodernism is even a bit of a trope in the skeptic movement.

Rejecting postmodernism (and continental philosophy) is essentially a correct attitude, I believe. Being reflexively critical of postmodernism, however, might act as a sort of priming mechanism for skeptics when it comes to other issues that might sound vaguely related to postmodernism. Specifically, there are many skeptics who are openly critical of feminism, gender studies, and so-called „social justice warriors“. I don’t think it is wrong for members of the skeptic movement to have opinions and beliefs on issues of morality. It just seems to me that some opinions and beliefs of skeptics are not derived from substantive arguments, but rather from simple heuristics – such as, perhaps, that anything that vaguely touches upon issues that continental philosophy also touches upon (inequality, sexism, social justice, and so forth) is automatically wrong.

In 2017, the skeptics James Lindsay and Pether Boghossian published a fake paper in the style of the Alan Sokal fake paper from 1996. The paper is called „The conceptual penis as a social construct“, and it was intended to sort of „debunk“ gender studies¹⁹. The hoax was widely praised in the skeptic community as evidence that gender studies are nonsense, just as postmodernism is. Upon closer inspection, though, the joke turned out to be on skeptics, not on gender studies. As Alan Sokal himself noted²⁰, the hoax proves nothing about gender studies. The fake paper was not published in a gender studies journal, but instead in a generalist social science pay-for-publication journal. The conceptual penis hoax did not „debunk“ gender studies in any way (Which is not to say that the field of gender studies is not without problems.). Instead, the conceptual penis hoax exposed the irrational, confirmation bias-driven desire of parts of the skeptic movement to partly reject the debate about some moral and, in extension, political issues.

I am concerned with how the skeptic movement is dealing with questions of morality. Parts of the skeptic movement have apparently espoused moral positions and discursive styles similar to those of, say, the „alt-right“. The problem with that is not a specific moral position, since there is no a priori reason why members of the alt-right cannot hold a correct moral position. For example, some prominent members of the alt-right criticize so-called safe spaces and trigger warnings on university campuses^{21 22}, and I believe that safe spaces and trigger warnings are indeed morally dubious at best²³. What matters is not a specific moral position, but the process of arriving at that position. When it comes to morality, many skeptics seem to have no problem with abandoning principles that they otherwise cherish, such as logically sound arguments. Let it be noted that the terrain of morality within the skeptic movement is mostly unmapped, however, so my anecdotal observations might be imprecise and inaccurate. In any way, the skeptic movement should embrace rigorous analysis about moral issues and not adopt potentially fallacious ad hoc conclusions.

The branding problem

The skeptic movement is facing a perennial challenge: The branding problem. Saying that you or that an organization is „skeptical“ carries with it a negative connotation. Of course, rational skepticism is not the same as everyday skepticism in the sense of simple disbelief. Conveying that, however, is difficult. Also, there are „skeptical“ groups out there that have very little to do with rational skepticism, such as climate change „skeptics“ or vaccination „skeptics“. I don’t know that there is a clear path for dealing with the branding problem. Perhaps skeptical organizations should simply rebrand to such a degree that „skeptic“ is not in their name. In addition, the skeptic movement should produce easy to understand information about what rational skepticism is.

Conclusion: What is the future of rational skepticism?

It is very difficult to predict where the movement of rational skepticism is going. The best might be yet to come: If the skeptic movement embraces a reformation that deals with the problems that I have tried to outline above, I am confident that the skeptic movement can become more efficient and more effective.

A skeptical reformation is easier said than done. Having a more focused and more effective skeptic movement is something that a majority of skeptics would probably like, but making that reformation happen is difficult. I don’t think the skeptical reformation is going to be a grassroots, bottom up process. Instead, a few skeptical organizations will have to take the lead and position themselves as focal points of the modernization of the skeptic movement. It is not obvious where the cradle of the skeptical reformation can and should be. The skeptic movement originated with and was popularized by North American individuals, groups, and organizations, but there is no reason why the skeptical reformation should not be initiated by European organizations.

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